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1Plato* Sophist, 251-259
J. L. Ackrill, University o f Chicago
This paper was presented by J. L. Ackrill to the Society fo r Ancient Greek Philosophy at its meeting in
Boston in 1955. It has been copiedfrom a decaying text by A. Preus, February/March 2017.
This section o f the Sophist is no doubt one o f the most important Mid controversial 
passages in Plato’s dialogues. My purpose is not to attempt a full interpretation o f it, but to 
discuss one question, taking up in particular some remarks made by Professor Comford (in 
Plato ’s Theory o f Knowledge) and by Mr. R. Robinson (in his paper on Plato’s Parmenides, 
Classical Philology, 1942).
It may be useful to give first a very brief and unargued analysis o f the passage. Plato 
seeks to prove that concepts1 are related in certain definite ways, that there is a συμπλοκή είδών 
(251d-252e). Next (253) he assigns to philosophy or dialectic the task o f discovering what these 
relations are: the philosopher w ill have a  clear view o f the whole range o f concepts and o f how 
they are inter-connected, whether in genus-species pyramids or in other ways. Plato now gives a 
sample o f such philosophizing. Choosing some concepts highly relevant to problems already 
broached in the Sophist he first (254-255) establishes that they are all different one from the 
other (the philosopher m ust μήτε ταύτόν είδος ετερον ήγήσασθαι μήτε ετερον δν ταύτόν 253dl- 
3); and then (255e-258) elicits the relationships in which they stand to  one another. The effort to 
discover and state these relationships throws light on the puzzling notions δν and μή δν and 
enables Plato (259) to set aside with contempt certain puzzles and paradoxes propounded by 
superficial thinkers. He refers finally (259e) to the absolute necessity there is for concepts to be 
in definite relations to one another if  there is to be discourse at all; διά γάρ την άλλήλων των 
είδών συμπλοκήν ό λόγος γέγονεν ήμΐν.
The question I wish to raise is this. Is it correct to say that one o f Plato’s achievements in 
this passage is the ‘discovery o f the copula’, or the ‘recognition o f ambiguity o f εστιν’ as used on 
the one hand in statements o f identity and on the other hand in attributive statements? I feel little 
doubt that it is correct to say this, but Comford and Robinson (to mention no others) deny it. 
After a remark on the question itself I shall try state briefly a case for answering it affirmatively, 
and shall then consider some o f the counter-arguments that have been put forward.
As for the question itself: clearly we should be concerned with whether Plato made a 
philosophical advance which we might reasonably describe in such phrases as I have quoted, but 
no great stress is to be laid on these particular phrases. Thus it is no doubt odd to say that Plato 
(or anyone else) discovered the popula. But did he draw attention to it? Did he expound or 
expose the various roles o f the verb είναι? Many o f his predecessors and contemporaries reached 
bizarre conclusions by confusing different uses o f the word; did Plato respond by elucidating 
these different uses? These are the real questions. Again, it would be pedantic to deny that Plato 
recognized the ambiguity o f εστιν merely on the ground that he had no word meaning
‘ambiguity’, or on the ground tjjqt he nowhere says ‘the word εστιν sometimes m eans....... and
sometimes means .....’. I f  he in fact glosses or explains or analyses the meaning o f a word in one
1 The use o f this term may seem provocative. But whether or not the είδη and γένη o f the Sophist are something 
more than ‘mere’ concepts, a good deal o f interpretation o f251-259 can satisfactorily proceed on the assumption 
that they are at least ‘concepts’.
2way in some contexts and in another in others, and if  this is part o f a serious exposition o f 
doctrine, then it may very well be right to credit him with ‘recognizing an ambiguity’. The 
serious objects to attributing to Plato the ‘discovery o f the copula’ are not, o f course, o f this 
pedantic kind, but involve real problems o f interpretation. I have mentioned these trivial points 
only in order to indicate, by contrast, what the substantial question at issue is.
It is generally agreed (and Comford does not deny this, p. 296) that Plato marks o ff the 
existential use o f εστιν from at least some other use. He does not o f course do this by simply 
saying ‘sometimes but not always the verb εστιν means “exists”’. If  Greeks had a familiar word 
for ‘exists’ as opposed to ‘is ....’ there would have been no Parmenidean confusion for Plato and 
Aristotle to clear up. How Plato does proceed can be seen from his remark about κίνησις at 
256al : εστι δε γε διά το μετέχειν τοΰ δντος. This διά does not introduce a p ro o fthat κίνησις 
εστιν: this was already agreed before and used to establish a connection between κίνησις and το 
ον (254dl0). Nor, obviously, does it introduce the cause why κίνησις εστιν: it does not refer to 
some event or state which resulted in the further state described by die sentence κίνησις εστιν. 
The words introduced by δία give an expansion or analysis o f εστιν, as this word is used in 
κίνησις εστιν, i.e. as used existentially. Μ ετέχει του δντος is the philosopher’s equivalent o f the 
existential εστιν; but, as will be seen, it is not his equivalent for εστιν in its other uses. So the 
existential meaning is marked off.
The philosopher’s formulation, κίνησις μετέχει τοΰ δντος, both elucidates the sense o f 
εστιν in κίνησις εστιν and also makes clear (what is not clear in the compressed colloquial 
formulation) the structure o f the fact being stated; makes clear, that is, that a certain connection 
is being asserted between two concepts. The philosopher’s formulation contains not only the 
names o f the two concepts but also a word indicating their coherence (μετέχει), not itself the 
name o f an είδος but ju st a sign o f connectedness or synthesis. This point, the role o f μετέχειν in 
the dialectician’s language, will come up again shortly.
There remain two other meanings o f εστιν, as copula and as identity-sign. The 
assimilation o f these had led to a denial o f the possibility o f any true non-tautological statements. 
W hat is needed, in order to deprive this paradox o f its power, is a clear demonstration o f how the 
two uses o f εστιν differ. By ‘demonstration’ I do not mean ‘proof, but ‘exhibition’ or ‘display’. 
Not all absurd philosophical theses can be proved  false. Often the only way to sterilize a paradox 
is to expose and lay bare the confusion from which it springs. So what one m ust do for εστιν is to 
draw attention to these two different uses, indicate how they are related, and if  possible provide 
for each an alternative mode o f expression so as to help remove even the slightest temptation to 
confuse the two.
Consider how Plato deals, in 256al0-b4, with the pair of statements κίνησις έστι ταύτόν, 
κίνησις ούκ εστι ταύτόν. These look like contradictories, yet we want to assert both. However 
we need not really be worried (ού δυσχεραντέον); for we are not in both statements speaking 
ομοίως. Analysis o f each statement (introduced again by διά) will show us exactly what is being 
asserted in each and enable us to see that there is no contradiction between them when they are 
properly understood. The first statement means κίνησις μετέχει ταύτου. We do not intend to be 
denying this when we assert the second statement; it means κίνησις μετέχει θατέρου προς 
ταύτόν. There is no contradiction.
The essential points in Plato’s analysis or transformation of the two statements are these:
(1) where εστιν is being used as copula it gets replaced in the philosopher’s version by μετέχει;
(2) for ούκ εστιν where εστιν occurs not as copula but as identity-sign the philosopher’s version
3is (not ού μετέχει; but) μετέχει θατέρου (προς...)· What do these substitutions show? They show 
that εστιν serves merely to connect two concepts which are named; that in another use the 
concept o f Identity (or Difference) is expressed, together with the fact that something (viz. the 
concept named by the subject-word o f the sentence) falls under the concept Identity (or 
Difference).
W ith Plato’s procedure here one may compare a passage in Frege’s paper Über B egriff 
und Gegenstand (I quote Mr. Geach’s translation, in Translations from  the Philosophical 
Writings o f  Gottlob Frege, edited by Peter Geach and Max Black). One can just as well assert o f 
a thing that it is Alexander the Great, or is the number four, or is the planet Venus, as that it is 
green or is a mammal. But, as Frege points out, one must distinguish the usages o f the word ‘is’. 
‘In the last two examples it serves as a copula, as a mere verbal sign o f predication. (In this sense 
the German word ist can sometimes be replaced by the mere personal suffix: cf. dies Blatt ist 
grün and dies Blatt grünt.2) We are here saying that something falls under a concept, and the 
grammatical predicate stands for this concept. In the first three examples, on the other hand, ‘is’ 
is used like the ‘equals’ sign in arithmetic, to express an equation.. . .  In the sentence ‘the 
morning star is Venus’, ‘is’ is obviously not the mere copula; its content is an essential part o f 
the predicate, so that the word ‘Venus’ does not constitute the whole of the predicate. One might 
say instead: ‘the morning star is no other than Venus’; what was previously implicit in the single 
word ‘is’ is here set forth in four separate words, and in ‘is no other than’ the word ‘is’ now 
really is the mere copula. W hat is predicated here is thus not Venus but no other than Venus. 
These words stand for a concept.’ (pp. 43-44)
Frege explains the copula by talking o f something’s falling under a concept. Plato uses 
for this the term μετέχειν. Frege expands die ‘is’ o f identity into ‘is no other than’, in which 
phrase the ‘is’ is simply the copula and ‘no other than ... ’ stands for a concept. Plato expands the 
εστιν o f identity into μετέχει ταύτου... (and ούκ εστιν into μετέχει θατέρου), where μετέχει does 
the copula’s job (‘falls under the concept’) and ταύτόν names a concept. It seems to me that in 
offering the analyses he does Plato, no less clearly than Frege, is engaged in distinguishing 
different uses o f ‘is’. In all he distinguishes three, and he provides for each different sense o f 
εστιν a new mode o f expression (μετέχει..., μετέχει του οντος, μετέχει ταύτου).
The claim that one o f the things Plato does in Sophist 251-259 is to elucidate the 
distinction between copula and identity-sign would seem to be supported by the following 
consideration: that this distinction is just what is required to immunize us against the paradoxes 
o f the οψιμαθείς (25 lb), and Plato does suppose that these foolish people have been put in their 
place by his discussion (259c-d). Robinson however denies that this consideration has any force. 
He writes (p. 174): ‘Plato certainly thought o f his Communion as refuting the “Late Learners”. 
But it does not follow that he thought the manner o f refutation was to show that they confused 
attribution with identity. Ñ or is there anything in the text to show that he thought this.’ Robinson 
is certainly right to say that it does not follow . Still we are surely entitled -  or rather obliged -  to 
make some reasonable suggestion as to how exactly Plato did suppose him self to have exposed 
the error o f the Tate learners’. I f  the interpretation o f 256al0-b4 outlined above is right that the 
passage contains what is an effective exposure o f Tate learners’ who construed every ‘is’ as a 
sign o f identity. If so, it is natural to infer that Plato him self regarded the distinction drawn in 
that passage (and elsewhere) as the crucial counter-move against the Tate learners’. Further, if
2 One is reminded o f Aristotle, Physics 185b28: oi δέ λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, δη ό άνθρωπος ού λευκός έστιν άλλα 
λελεύκεται, ούδέ βαδίδων έστίν άλλα βαδίζει.
4no other reasonable suggestion can be made as to how exactly Plato did think had disposed o f 
the ‘late learners’ this fact can be used as an argument in favour o f the above interpretation o f 
256a-b which does find in it an important point directly relevant to, and destructive of, the 
paradoxical puzzle o f the οψιμαθείς.
Now it might be suggested that it is by his proof that there is Communion among είδη 
(25 ld-252e) that Plato refutes the view that only identical statements are possible: that it is here, 
and not in some later talk about ov and μή öv, that he supposes himself to be refuting the ‘late 
learners’. But what are the arguments by which he proves there is Communion? The first 
argument (251e7-252b7) is to the effect that if  there were no Communion then philosophers and 
‘physicists’ in propounding their various views would in fact have been ‘saying nothing’ (ούδέν 
αν λέγοιεν). The argument simply assumes that this last is not the case, that Empedocles and the 
rest were talking sense. But this assumption is just what the Tate learners’, maintaining their 
paradox, would deny; and an argument based upon it is obviously o f no force against them. The 
second argument (252b8-dl) is that the theory that there is no Communion cannot be stated 
without implying its own falsity. As applied to the Tate learners’ the argument would be: you say 
that only identity-statements can be true; but this statement o f yours -  ‘only identity-statements 
can be true’ -  is not itself an identity-statement; so it cannot (on your own admission) be true. 
Now this argument is certainly formidable and might well put a Tate learner’ to silence: he could 
hardly be expected to distinguish between first- and second-order statements. Yet as a refutation 
o f the thesis itself it is surely superficial and unsatisfactory. For the thesis was put forward not 
only by elderly jokers, but also by serious thinkers, who felt themselves obliged to maintain it for 
what seemed to them decisive theoretical reasons. Robinson writes as follows (p. 175) ‘To such 
more responsible thinkers it is folly to say: “But you obviously say ‘man is good’; and, if  you 
could not, all discourse whatever would be impossible, including the paradox that you cannot say 
‘man is good’”. For these thinkers already know that you can say that “man is good” and that the 
supposition that you cannot immediately destroys all thought and speech. Their trouble is that, 
nevertheless, they seem to see a good reason for denying that you can say that “man is good”. 
W hat they want is to be shown the fallacy in the argument which troubles them. They know it 
must be a fallacy; but they want to see what it is. Now for such thinkers Plato’s exposition o f his 
doctrine o f Communion is no help whatever. For he merely points to the fact that we must be 
able to say “man is good”, because otherwise no thought or communication would be possible.
He does not even notice any argument to the contrary, much less show where they go wrong’. I 
agree with Robinson that, for the reason he gives, Plato’s proof of Communion cannot be 
regarded as disposing satisfactorily o f the paradoxical thesis (even though the second argument 
in  the proof is valid against the thesis); for nothing is done to expose the error or confusion 
which led serious persons to embrace the paradox. The philosophical refutation o f paradoxes (for 
instance, Zeno’s paradoxes o f motion) consists o f undermining the arguments on which the 
paradoxical conclusions are based, not in reiterating -  what everyone knows already -  that the 
conclusions are absurd. W hile admitting, therefore, that the proof o f Communion does contain an 
argument which can be properly used against the Tate learners’, I find it hard to believe that this 
is the whole o f what Plato has to say to discredit the thesis that only identity-statements can be 
true. I should expect to find him, in  some other passage, exposing the rotten foundations on 
which that thesis was built. And this, I suggest, he does (e.g. in the passage previously discussed) 
by clearly distinguishing the two different uses o f εστιν, as copula and as identity-sign, and by 
showing how the two uses are related.
5Let us tum  now to Comford. He says that the copula ‘has no place anywhere in Plato’s 
scheme o f the relations o f Forms’ (p. 279). The relation between Forms that combine -  
‘blending’ -  is a symmetrical relation, so it cannot be the same as the relation o f subject to 
predicate in an attributive statement, i.e. the relation indicated by tibe copula (pp. 256-7, cp. p. 
266).
First a very general point. The relation ‘being associated with’ (or ‘being connected 
w ith’) is certainly a symmetrical relation. But there are many different ways in which things or 
people may be associated or connected: as father and son, employer and employee, and so on. 
One may say o f all the members o f a family that each is connected with the other. But if  one 
wishes to say how they are connected, one with another, one must employ such expressions as 
‘father o f  and ‘niece o f , which do not stand for symmetrical relations. Now it is agreed by 
Comford that the philosopher’s task, according to Plato, is to ‘discern clearly the hierarchy o f 
Forms ... and make out its articulate structure’ (pp. 263-4). Every statement the philosopher 
makes, in performing this task, may be expected to assert some relationship or association 
between Forms. And ‘association’ is indeed a symmetrical relation. But surely the philosopher 
could not possibly achieve his purpose without specifying the kind o f association there is in each 
case. And he could not do this without bringing in some non-symmetricai relations. Consider the 
following small extract o f a possible ‘map o f the Forms’:
The structure exhibited here must be described by the philosopher; and to do this he must advert 
to a non-symmetrical relationship. Justice and virtue are not merely connected; they are 
connected in a particular way: Justice is a species o/V irtue. Similarly, in the above diagram, the 
words ‘Virtue’ and ‘Justice’ are not merely close together; one is under the other.
Non-symmetrical relations must then be invoked if  a complex structure is to be 
described; and Plato was fully aware o f the complexity o f structure o f ‘tibe world o f Forms’
(Sophist 253d). Nor do his analogies with letters and musical notes (253a-b) support the idea that 
the dialectician would, according to him, simply assert symmetrical relationships between εϊδη. 
If  we are to say whether ‘f  and ‘g’ fit together, with the aid o f T  to make an English word, we 
must obviously specify the order in which the letters are to be taken. ‘G if is not a word, ‘fig’ is. 
The order o f notes in music is equally important: a given scale is not just such-and-such notes, 
but such-and-such notes in a certain order. So whatever terminology one uses to state the facts 
about spelling or scales or ‘the world o f Forms’, some non-symmetrical relation must be brought 
in.
There seems to be a difficulty here for Comford’s view. For if  every philosopher’s 
statement tells o f a ‘blending’, if  the only Communion he can report is symmetrical, how can he 
ever express irreducibly non-symmetrical truths, such as that Justice is a species o f Virtue?
To this it w ill be objected that Sophist 251-9, though it implies that the philosopher will 
have to investigate and state relations between genera and species, does not itself explore such 
relations; so in a proper interpretation o f the passage we should leave them out o f account and 
concentrate on how Plato actually proceeds in  exhibiting the relations which he does in  fact 
consider. Let us then look at some o f the statements o f Communion which Plato makes.
6First, ‘Motion exists’ (‘change’ would be better; I use Comford’s word). Comford says 
(p. 256): ‘ “Motion exists” means that the Form M otion blends with the Form Existence’; and (p. 
279); ‘ “M otion blends with Existence” is taken as equivalent to “Motion exists’” . He also says 
(p. 278): ‘The relation intended (sc. by “blending) is not the meaning o f the “copula”...; for we 
can equally say “Existence blends with Motion’” . Taken together these remarks lead to 
absurdity. For if  ‘Motion blends with Existence’ means ‘Motion exists’, then ‘Existence blends 
with M otion’ must mean ‘Existence moves’. Plato certainly did not intend this, and the trouble 
clearly lies in Comford’s insistence on the ‘blending’ metaphor (which suggests a symmetrical 
relation) to the exclusion o f other metaphors (which do not). What ‘Motion exists’ is equivalent 
to is not ‘M otion blends with Existence’ (‘blending’ being symmetrical) but ‘Motion shares in or 
partakes o f Existence’ (‘partaking o f  being non-symmetrical). If A partakes o f B then it is hue 
to say, less determinately, that A blends with B, and this is equivalent to saying that B blends 
with A; but ‘A partakes o f B’ is not equivalent to saying that ‘B partakes o f A ’. Comford’s 
remarks quoted above lead to absurdity because he will not let into his exposition any non- 
symmetrical expression like ‘partakes of, — even though Plato’s exposition bristles with this 
metaphor.
Next, ‘M otion is different from Rest’. Now this is indeed equivalent to ‘Rest is different 
from M otion’. But before drawing any inference concerning ‘Communion’ we must put the 
statement into its analysed form, into dialectician’s terminology. We get: ‘Motion communicates 
with Difference from Rest’. The question is whether ‘communicates w ith’ in this formulation can 
be taken to stand for a symmetrical relation. But if  it is so taken we must be prepared to say that 
‘Motion communicates with Difference from Rest’ is equivalent to ‘Difference from Rest 
communicates with M otion’; for the Communion asserted in the first place is evidently between 
Motion on the one hand and Difference from Rest on the other. But then, since ‘Motion 
communicates with Difference from Rest’ is the technical way of saying that Motion is different 
from Rest we m ust suppose that ‘Difference from Rest communicates with M otion’ is the 
technical way o f saying that Difference from Rest moves. And we shall find ourselves claiming 
that ‘M otion is different from Rest’ means the same as ‘Difference from Rest moves’. As before, 
this absurd conclusion follows from taking ‘communicates with’ as standing for a symmetrical 
relation. I f  ‘M otion communicates with Difference from Rest’ means that Motion is different 
from Rest (as it clearly does), then ‘communicates w ith’ must here stand not for ‘blending’ but 
for a non-symmetrical relation (‘partaking o f) . It is true that if  A partakes o f Difference from B, 
then B partakes o f Difference from A. But this is because o f the symmetrical nature o f 
difference; ‘partaking o f  is itself not symmetrical.
But these considerations, it may be said, are still too general and involve too much 
extrapolation and ‘interpretation’. This objection is reasonable but hardly decisive. One must 
suppose that Plato had something intelligible and consistent in his mind when writing the very 
taut piece o f exposition in Sophist 251-9. If  Comford’s account leads, on reflection, to grave 
difficulties or absurdities this is a prim a facie argument against it.
Still it is certainly necessary to look closely at the details of Plato’s terminology. 
Considering the various terms he uses in speaking o f relations among είδη, one would expect 
some (e.g. συμμείγνυσθαι) to stand for the rather indeterminate symmetrical notion ‘association’, 
and others (e.g. μετέχειν) to stand for some more determinate non-symmetrical relation.
Comford denies that this expectation is ftdfilled. Speaking o f statements about genus and species 
he writes (pp. 296-7): ‘The appropriate word would be “partake o f’ (μετέχειν), indicating that 
genus and species are blended but do not coincide. But he (sc. Plato) does not use “partake o f ’
7with precision or distinguish “partaking” from the mutual relation called “blending” or 
“combining” (συμμειξις, κοινωνία)’. Comford supports his assertion that ‘participation’ between 
Forms is a symmetrical relation by reference to 255d4 (p. 256): ‘At 255c,d Existents (όντα) are 
divided into two Forms or Kinds (το καθ’ αυτό and τό προς άλλο) and then Existence is 
described as “partaking o f ’ both these subordinate Forms. So the generic Form partakes o f 
(blends with) die specific form no less than the specific Form partakes o f the generic’. And in his 
footnote on 255d4, he says: ‘Note that Existence, which includes both these Forms (sc. το καθ’ 
αυτό and τό προς άλλο), is said to partake o/both. This is one of the places which show that 
“partaking o f ’ is symmetrical in the case o f the Forms.’ I do not know which are the other places 
Comford alludes to: his explicit argument that μέθεξις is symmetrical (hence nothing to do with 
the copula) rests on the one passage 255d. He does not pay special attention to all the other 
occurrences o f the μεθεξις metaphor. Nor does he consider the possibility that μεθεξις does not 
always stand for a reciprocal relation; one would be prepared to find that it sometimes did 
(‘being associated w ith’) and sometimes did not (‘sharing in’).
Professor Karl Dürr, in  his paper “Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik”
{Museum Helveticum  1945, especially pp. 171-175), assigned precise and distinct meanings to 
various terms used by Plato in Sophist 251-9, but did not attempt a full justification. Sir David 
Ross has made the following important observation, in Plato ’s Theory o f Ideas, p. 111, n. 6: 
‘Plato uses κοινωνία, κοινωνεΐν, επικοινωνία, προσκοινωνεΐν in two different constructions -  
with the genitive (250b9,252a2, b9,254c5,256b2,260e2) and with the dative (251d9, e8,
252d3,253a8,254b8, c l, 257a9,260e5). In the former usage the verbs mean “share in”; in the 
latter they mean “combine with” or “communicate with”.’ I do not know why Ross adds that 
‘though Plato uses the two different constructions, he does not seem to attach any importance to 
the difference between them.’ Plato does not use the two constructions indiscriminately or 
interchangeably. A comparison between the two groups o f passages yields a clear result (I leave 
out o f account 260e2 and e5, which are in  the perplexing discussion o f false belief, not in the 
main section on κοινωνία γενών; 250b9 is also outside this section). Κοινωνεΐν followed by the 
genitive (e.g. του ετέρου) is used where the fact being asserted is that some είδος is (copula) 
such-and-such (e.g. different from ...), i.e. it is used to express the fact that one concept fa lls  
under another. The dative construction, on the other hand, is used in highly general remarks 
about the connectedness o f είδη, where no definite fact as to any particular pair o f είδη is being 
stated. Surely this confirms -  what ordinary Greek usage would suggest -  that Plato consciously 
uses the word κοινωνεΐν in two different ways: in one it stands for the general symmetrical 
notion o f ‘connectedness’, in the other it stands for a determinate non-symmetrical notion, 
‘sharing in’. The former is appropriate to broad comments on the inter-connection o f είδη, but 
the latter is required when the precise relations o f particular είδη are to be stated.
As for μετέχειν two points are especially important. Firstly, in 251-9 the verb (or its 
noun) occurs 13 times. One o f these occurrences is in the passage used by Comford in his 
argument quoted above (255d4). But in all the other twelve cases it is clear that the truth 
expressed by ‘A-ness μετέχει B-ness’ is that A-ness is (copula) B, and never that B-ness is 
(copula) A. For instance, το ον μετέχει θατέρου... formulates the fact that Existence is different 
from ... ; it does not serve equally to express the fact that Difference exists -  that is expressed by 
θατέρου μετέχει του όντος. This would surely be a remarkable coincidence if  the relation Plato 
intended by μετέχειν were in fact symmetrical.
8Secondly, it is worth attending particularly to the passage officially devoted to the 
statement o f certain relations among the five chosen είδη, 255e8-257al 1. Here the objective is to 
state definite truths in careful philosophical terminology; not merely to advert to the fact that 
there are connections among είδη but to say precisely what some o f them are. Now in this 
passage Comford’s favourite metaphor occurs once (256b9), in a purely general reference to the 
connectedness o f concepts (εϊπερ των γενών συγχωρησόμεθα τα μεν άλλήλοις έθέλειν 
μείγνυσθαι, τα δέ μή). And κοινωνία with the dative occurs once in an equally unspecific context 
(έπείπερ εχει κοινωνίαν άλλήλοις ή των γενών φύσις, 256a9). The other terms used are as 
follows: κοινωνία with the genitive occurs once (256a2) and is used to state the definite 
relationship holding between two named είδη (κίνησις and θάτερον); the fact stated is that 
M otion is different from ..., and not that Difference moves. Μεταλαμβάνειν occurs once (256b6) 
in a passage whose interpretation is controversial. But the significance o f the verb is clear. If it 
were true to say ‘κίνησις μεταλαμβάνει στάσεως’ then one could rightly say ‘κίνησις έστι 
στάσιμος.’ Μετέχειν (or μέθεξις) occurs five times (256al, a7, b l, d9, e3), in each case 
expressing the relation between two named είδη the first o f which falls under the second. Thus 
all the real work in the section 255e8-257al 1, all the exposition o f actual connections between 
particular είδη, is done by the terms μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, and κοινωνεΐν (with genitive),-  
that is, by the non-symmetrical metaphor ‘partaking o f  which Comford is so determined to 
exclude. And the role o f ‘partaking o f  in Plato’s terminology is clear: ‘partakes o f  followed by 
an abstract noun, the name o f a concept, is equivalent to the ordinary language expression 
consisting o f ‘is’ (copula) followed by the adjective derived from that abstract noun.
This examination o f Plato’s use o f some terms, though obviously far from exhaustive, is,
I think, sufficient to discredit Comford’s insistence on ‘blending’ as the one safe clue to Plato’s 
meaning, and to establish that μετέχειν and its variants μεταλαμβάνειν and κοινωνεΐν (with 
genitive) are not used by Plato as mere alternatives for συμμειγνυσθαι. I w ill relegate to a  note3
3 255c 12-d7. Plato’s purpose here is to establish that to  óv and τ6 έτερον are two different γένη. But it is difficult to 
interpret the argument in a way that makes it even seem plausible. The obvious interpretation is this: Some όντα are 
called what they are καθ’ αύτό, others πρ6ς άλλο; but all έτερα are called what they are προς άλλο; therefore to ov is 
a different concept from to  έτερον. The difficulty with this is that, as Plato insists, every single είδος partakes both 
o f τ6 öv and το ετερον. So any sub-division o f είδη that are δντα is straightway a sub-division o f είδη that are έτερα. 
The two concepts cannot be distinguished by contrasting the είδη that fall under one with those that fall under the 
other; for there is no such contrast.
Perhaps the point about Difference is this: that anything that is different is necessarily d ifferent/^»».... 
Then indeed there is a proper contrast with Existence, but it is not the contrast Plato seems to be describing. The 
contrast is that anything that is existent is (simply) existent,- and not existent to, of, or from ...; i.e. Difference is 
essentially πρός άλλο. Existence is essentially καθ’ αύτό. But this is not what Plato is saying.
Leaving the interpretation o f the argument undecided, let us try to elucidate the meaning o f μετέχειν in 
255d4 by noticing the reason Plato advances for asserting that Existence ‘partakes o f  both τό καθ’ αύτό and to πρός 
άλλο. The reason is not that both o f these ‘partake o f  Existence. If ‘partaking’ just meant ‘blending’ this would in 
fact be a perfectly adequate reason; by the same token it would be obvious that Difference too ‘partook o f  both τό 
καθ’ αύτό and τό πρός άλλο, since each o f them certainly must ‘partake o f  Difference. Plato’s reason for saying that 
Existence ‘partakes o f  both is that some είδη that partake o f Existence (some όντα) also partake o f τό καθ’ αύτό, 
while other είδη that partake o f Existence also partake o f τό πρός άλλο. This at least is the plainest meaning o f 
255cl2-13. And if  this is Plato’s reason we can perhaps make use o f it in interpreting the statement that Existence 
άμφοΐν μετέχει τοΐν είδοΐν (255d4). Μετέχει here stands neither for ‘blending’ nor for the simple notion o f 
‘partaking o f  found in so many other passages. It stands for a more complex relation which is, however, ‘reducible’ 
in a certain way to the ordinary simple ‘partaking o f . If, for mere convenience, we call this more complex relation 
‘sharing in’, we can offer the following analysis: ‘A shares in both B and C’ means the same as ‘Some είδη that
9some remarks about 255d, the passage Comford exploits; if  necessary it must be frankly 
admitted that in this passage μετέχειν is used in an exceptional way. But one passage cannot be 
allowed to outweigh a dozen others.
I have tried to argue, first, that the verb μετέχειν (with its variants) has a role in Plato’s 
philosophical language corresponding to the role o f the copula in ordinary language; and, 
second, that by his analysis o f various statements Plato brings out (and means to bring out) the 
difference between the copula (μετέχει...), the sign o f identity (μετέχει ταύτοΰ) and the 
existential εστιν (μετέχει του οντος).
partake o f A partake o f B, and some είδη that partake o f A partake o f C \ So μετέχειν in 255d4 is indeed used 
differently from how it is used in other places. But it still stands for a non-symmetrical relation; a relation, 
moreover, which can be fully explained in terms o f the ordinary notion o f μέθεξις.
